@techreport{96e64bdc6dc34d499d1cb20c370dddf5,

title = "Efficiency, Reciprocity and Expectations in an Experimental Game",

abstract = "We experimentally investigate the nature of strategic interaction in a 2-player game.Player 1may take x Dutch guilders (f x) and end the game (player 2 then gets f 0), or let player 2 split f 20 between the players. x is a treatment variable taking values of f 4, 7, 10, 13, and 16.We find that most players 2 {"}give away{"} positive amounts (f6 on average), but their choices are independent of x.We explicitly measure the players' beliefs and find that many players 1 expect to get back no more than f x but nevertheless let player 2 split the f 20, and that the behavior by the players 2 is consistent with a theory of a guilt based on psychological game theory.",

keywords = "game theory",

author = "M. Dufwenberg and U. Gneezy",

note = "Pagination: 20",

year = "1996",

language = "English",

volume = "1996-79",

series = "CentER Discussion Paper",

publisher = "Microeconomics",

type = "WorkingPaper",

institution = "Microeconomics",

}